Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter Watson, Paul Benacerraf and Rom Harr

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90 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson]
The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf]
Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C]
A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf]
To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf]
Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf]
Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf]
For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend]
No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe]
If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf]
If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf]
The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf]
Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf]
Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf]
How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf]
Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
There are 23 core brain functions, with known circuit, transmitters, genes and behaviour [Watson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Traditional ideas of the mind were weakened in the 1950s by mind-influencing drugs [Watson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans have been hunter-gatherers for 99.5% of their existence [Watson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
The Uncertainty Principle implies that cause and effect can't be measured [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
The interference of light through two slits confirmed that it is waves [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons rotate in hyrogen atoms 10^13 times per second [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum theory explains why nature is made up of units, such as elements [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Only four particles are needed for matter: up and down quark, electron, electron-neutrino [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
The shape of molecules is important, as well as the atoms and their bonds [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
In 1828 the animal substance urea was manufactured from inorganic ingredients [Watson]
Information is physical, and living can be seen as replicating and preserving information [Watson]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson]
The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson]
Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 3. Zoroastrianism
The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson]
Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson]
Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 1. Confucianism
Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson]